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and administrative agency law. He has taught on seven law faculties, 
including (for three years until 1971) the law faculty of the national university 
in Ethiopia where he was sponsored first by the U.S. Peace Corps and later by 
the Ford Foundation, and worked for the Ministry of Agriculture’s wildlife 
and national parks bureau. While teaching public law in Ethiopia, he 
redrafted the laws protecting parks and refugees, assisted in the publication 
of the Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia, and helped organize the first United 
Nations Conference on Individual Rights in Africa. 
 
[I present today not as an expert, but as a legal professional who in the past 
spent a deep and fulfilling time in the Horn of Africa, and continue to carry a 
warm appreciation, interest, and concern for the land and its people. When 
Ato Fasil Amdetsion asked me to speak — thinking that my thoughts on 
perspectives of cultural relativity on being a ferenj [foreigner] observer of the 
Horn of Africa might be useful — I was honored, and I hope he was at least 
slightly correct. The invitation to speak has released a flood of memories.... ] 
 
The first time I flew into Ethiopia (as it all was then) 35 years ago, I remember I was 
sitting at the window on the right side of the plane after a long overnight flight from 
Europe, and looking out as we came down out of the night sky into early morning. I 
saw that amazing landscape — a scrap of desert savannah, then a high escarpment 
and green-clad hills, dotted with tiny round houses with thatched roofs sitting in 
isolated clumps with no roads in sight, threshing circles on the windy ridgelines, then 
tin roofs of an isolated market town, and then some more sparsely settled hills and 
precariously perched fields....  
The man sitting beside me was an Ethiopian returning after ten years of education in 
the West. Leaning over me to look out the window (the physical separation distance 
expected between people in Ethiopia is much less than in the West), he drank in the 
view, and started to sigh joyfully — Aiee, ageré, ageré!... My Land, oh, my own land.... 
And as I imagine returning once more to that place, flying again into Addis Ababa or 
Asmara, I can sense intensely just what it will be like. I can see myself looking down 
from the plane window and I too will be thinking — ageré, ageré!... 
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But, of course, this is romantic nonsense, a wistful romantic projection. It is not my 
land and never was. True, I for a time felt deeply bonded to that place and its mosaic 
of people, but I speak virtually no Tigrinya or Oromiffa (I can say hello), and I speak 
fairly elementary Amharic, and I lived in that land for only three years...  
Yet for a ferenj professional who spends time in the Horn of Africa there are sights, 
smells, sounds, and places that do become deeply evocative: 
 
•the bustle of a Mercato bazaar with itinerant merchants hawking goods from all 
over this corner of the continent, 
•the sound and feel of that tiny railroad winding from the mile-high Asmara 
plateau down to the sea at Massawa, 
•the smell of eucalyptus smoke in the morning and mitmita spices in the air, 
•the shimmer of hot air over a parched desert savannah near Dire Dawa as we look 
out from a cave that has its walls covered with delicate red and ochre figures of 
hunters and antelope painted there by human hands perhaps 200,000 years ago, 
•sounds drifting up steep slopes from villages far below in the Bale Mountains or 
the Simyens, 
•The echo of our voices, students’ and teacher’s, in the marble-walled chambers of 
the Sidist Kilo palace that had become the national law school, 
•And everywhere people who walk and live with great selfrespect, and come to you 
in conversation proud of their individuality, their people, their history, ... never 
slouching in abject self-condescension. 
 
But it is not my country. 
The juxtapositions of two different lands presents some fundamental questions that 
law-trained professionals should ask themselves when coming to work in a setting 
like Eritrea or Ethiopia, bridging between two worlds, two different cultures, two 
different eras of civic development — questions of cultural relativity. 
Cultural Relativity—the process of carrying one’s personality, ideas, and professional 
knowledge sensitively and effectively from one cultural setting into another without 
allowing either to dominate to the detriment of the other. 
This inquiry seems to have relevance beyond a review of expatriate experiences three 
decades ago. It may indeed be useful to a new group of Western-born law 
professionals who in the near future may be selected to go to work in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. Just last month I attended a meeting in Washington DC which launched a 
planning effort to send a new generation of young law school graduates to teach in 
law schools in Ethiopia and Eritrea, doing what my cadre did in the 1970s. It may also 
raise some useful issues for young professionals who have come here to the West 
from the Horn of Africa to study and will return to their homelands with what they 
have learned here. Everyone sitting in this Harvard Law School conference hall is to 
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some extent Westernized, and that will always pose questions about what will and 
won’t be relevant to one’s homeland upon return. 
Personal, Technical, & Political Cultural Relativity 
Let me address three separate parameters of cultural relativity: Personal Cultural 
Relativity, Technical Cultural Relativity, and Political Cultural Relativity (there are 
undoubtedly more, but these three may be most significant.) 
Personal Cultural Relativity 
Personal Cultural Relativity is relatively easy to prescribe. No matter who we are, we 
should strive to be ourselves wherever we go, while being open and engaged with our 
context of place and people, wherever they may be. When ferenj professionals go into 
a different culture, they are well advised for the sake of their own effectiveness and 
pleasure to relate to people with a sense of openness, attentiveness, and respect, and 
people will generally treat them as human beings. Trying hard to prepare, before one 
goes, to be good at what one will do, learning as much as possible about the culture, 
history, languages, and people of a place, everything will become richer and more 
effective. Moreover, even if one makes gauche cultural mistakes, but one is obviously 
trying to be attuned, those mistakes will generally be forgiven. (I remember a 
reception planned by a new U.S. Ambassador to introduce himself to a hundred 
Ethiopian government officials. He hadn’t realized that Ethiopians then largely abided 
by both the Jewish and Old Christian dietary laws, so he invited them on a Friday 
evening for hors d’oeuvres of lobster and ham. The honorable guests as a whole 
genially overlooked the ambassador’s gaffe.) 
 
Technical Cultural Relativity 
As to Technical Cultural Relativity, let me tell a short story: 
After teaching Public Law — agencies, administrative process, and constitutional law 
— for two years I was moved to another course assignment, and a newly-arrived 
professor from Germany came to take over my Public Law course. Professor “Hans” 
came to me before classes started and said to me: 
“I am taking over your Public Law course. Please to give me a copy of the 
Administrative Code.” 
“There is none,” I replied. 
 “Then please to give me a copy of the basic Administrative Process statute.” 
“There is none.” 
 “Then please to give me a copy of the Constitution’s Administrative Part.” 
“There is none.” 
 “Then please to tell me the Ethiopian Grundesnormen [defined fundamental principles 
of the legal system].” 
“There is none.” 
 “Then how do you teach your students this Public Law?” 
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So I explained that my predecessors and I went into the ministries and collected 
information and illuminating examples of how in actual practice issues were raised 
and handled effectively, or not so effectively, and then we studied them to find what 
worked best. We reviewed old Ethiopian legal texts including the Fetha Negast and 
the Nomocanon, and modern descriptions of complex social dispute resolution, and, 
coupled with case studies from other countries that seemed relevant, we wove these 
into a corpus of materials that could teach logic, analysis and relevant doctrinal 
norms. 
“You call zat Law?!?” he protested. “I vill teach no such thing! Instead I vill from my 
embassy get the students copies of the world’s finest Administrative Code, the West 
German Administrative Code, and they vill study that!” 
I suggested that this might not be very useful to Ethiopian students, but he insisted. A 
week later I heard that his students, understandably, were rebelling. But when I asked 
the following week, he said there was no longer any problem: “The students were 
very cross with me at first, but now all is vell, because I said all students vill get an ‘A’ 
no matter what.”  
Professor Tecola Hagos was in that class. (Now you know how he got an “A” in 
Public Law!) But I doubt he found much use for whatever he learned of the West 
German Administrative Code. 
In this setting, most unaccomodated ferenj doctrines and structures will be baldly 
useless and inappropriate in addressing the realities of Ethiopia or Eritrea, and some 
Western concepts, with sensitive adaptation perhaps, will be useful and welcome. 
Cultural relativity — sensing the needs of the context and the appropriateness of 
principles from abroad — requires a serious continuing effort to understand the 
elements and workings of the host nation and the points at which foreign doctrines 
and structures do and don’t serve fitting, useful purpose. 
Sensitivity to the host country can be carried too far, however. I remember during my 
Peace Corps law training in Addis being told by a trainer who had been in India about 
the experience of a group of young American professionals being trained likewise in 
India. Over the course of several weeks they learned some Hindi, and insisted on 
wearing saris for the women, national dress for the men, eating only Indian food, and 
to the best of their abilities replicating Indian manners and ideas. An official of the 
Government of India came to visit, and observed the group with circumspection. 
“This is quite amazing,” he said. “But do you know, in inviting you to our country, 
the last thing we thought we needed was more Indians!” 
So one must strike a balance between the Professor Hans stance and the Indigenous 
Clones model. For foreigners and Western-educated nationals operating in the 
developing country context, the balance is a bit like the Japanese concept of gai-atsu. 
Foreign experts can be welcomed for their ability to bring external expertise, but in 
fact their technical or intellectual offerings are to be incorporated or ignored according 
to the extent that their knowledge can be made appropriate to the new terrain. Slavish 
adoption of foreign concepts is likely to produce transplant rejection. Flexibility in 
shaping and applying new concepts to old lands is likely to serve the host nation’s 
needs far better. 
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And then there is the inexact but useful question, “Who is the client?” For foreigners 
and Western-educated nationals operating in the developing country context, it is 
important to seek a functional definition of just who it is for whom you are doing 
what you are doing.... For me as a teacher, my self-crafted client definition was easy: 
My clients were my students, who wished to gain a corpus of doctrine, structure, and 
functional analytical ability with which to proceed through their years ahead. Others 
who work for an embassy or corporation have similarly clear client definition. But 
what of us who worked in a ministry, or an NGO? For us the client is only technically 
defined as our supervisor. Beyond those persons often looms a grander client, but 
how to define it?: “The Nation,” in the sense of all the people who are in the polity? 
The citizens of the Nation in the future? Some expansive concept of human progress 
and perfectability? This client-defining inquiry is informative and necessary but 
typically is not easily or straightforwardly resolvable. 
 
Political Cultural Relativity 
Political Cultural Relativity: Let me address two different political settings: 
geopolitical and internal political.... 
 
Geopolitical:  
For at least most foreign professionals coming to Ethiopia or Eritrea, geopolitics is 
probably an inappropriate sphere, while being extremely relevant and significant for 
foreign-trained Ethiopian and Eritrean professionals returning to their home territory. 
The geography of the Horn of Africa carries its own inherent conundrums. In terms of 
soil, topography, and climate, there are a number of geophysical parameters that 
impose their own imperatives. Moreover, in terms of population, Ethiopia is now, I 
believe, the world’s largest landlocked nation. Eritrea is small in size and population, 
low on resources, and spreads its territory along the seacoast to Djibouti. For millenia 
these two land areas were integrally linked in terms of trade, culture, chromosomes, 
and religions. Today they are more isolated one from another than ever before. Others 
in this symposium, perhaps particularly Prof. Tecola Hagos, may address this 
geopolitical situation, but not I. 
Ethnic divisions and federalism are likewise not realms for the foreign-born 
professional. Ethnic divisions play a significant role in the geopolitical life of all lands 
in the Horn of Africa. They have been largely institutionalized in the jigsaw puzzle of 
federal states carved out of the Ethiopian land mass by the 1994 Constitution. The 
homogeneity of ethnicity-based states has its strengths, but also fissiparous tendencies 
and potential intolerance of internal minorities, but these issues too are best avoided 
by foreign-born law and policy consultants. (And the puzzles are never easily 
resolved. Upon returning to the USA my Africa-opened eyes were struck by the 
discovery of tendentious tribes in my native republic: the Sun Belt tribe, the Frost Belt 
tribe; the super-rich tribe and the rest; the evangelical tribe and the non-evangelicals; 
black and white; environmentalist and industrial polluters; and so on, all behaving 
like fractionalized, self-identified tribes.) 
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Religious divisions are far less problematic, comparatively speaking, since in my 
experience the distinctions between Muslim, Christian, and other religious creeds 
were not an overtly tangible obstacle course in the Horn of Africa as they are in so 
many other societies. 
War is a geopolitical as well as social calamity, and the Horn of Africa experienced a 
frustratingly foul example of war in 1998-99. Whether spawned by long-percolating 
antagonisms, as some say, or the cynically-opportunistic diversion motivations of 
leaders with personal animosities and a desire to deflect criticism of domestic 
shortcomings, à la Margaret Thatcher and George W. Bush, the war was a tragedy. 
The potential war that soon may occur following today’s ongoing saber-rattling 
deserves intensive foreign and domestic effort to stop this nonsense. 
But that too is beyond the jurisdiction of most of us. Yet there are useful correlative 
issues that may be obliquely addressed. If indeed a new generation of expatriate law 
teachers will be sent into Ethiopia and Eritrea, and perhaps nine more Ethiopian law 
schools created in various federal states (not at all a wise move, I think, adding 
daunting new requirements in staffing, funding, and logistics to a surfeit of six schools 
already in operation, but it may happen), the design of curriculum can have 
significant societal effects. It would be important, I think, to have the curriculums 
include extensive training in negotiation, mediation, and alternative dispute 
resolution techniques, rather than the adversarial attack-mode lawyering too-often 
characterizing modern legal training. 
 
Political Cultural Relativity: internal domestic politics 
For foreign-based professionals and consultants, and for Western-educated nationals 
operating in the developing country context, domestic politics are less easily avoided. 
Sometimes they will be thrust upon you, as trucks lumber by filled with arrested 
demonstrators, or, as happened to me, several of the cars of your government-
employed evening students are blown up by Molotov cocktails thrown by some of 
your young politically volatile day students. By being there, and by holding a 
particular professional position, one’s presence inevitably has political connotations 
and reverberations. No matter what the regime — Haile Sellassie, Mengistu, Isaias or 
Meles — your acquiescence in being there involves implicit political statements and 
choices. Some of the implications of this will be unpleasant, and you must address 
them with cultural relativity. 
Here’s one example on point — “Free Speech.” The individual right of Free Speech is 
not a unitary concept. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights promulgated by 
the United Nations in 1948 proclaims something that looks like a right to free speech: 
“[T]he advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and 
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration 
of the common people...” 
In practice, however, freedom of speech varies widely even in centuries-old industrial 
democracies as well as in most countries now moving toward democracy, and while it 
is an aspiration widely held, it also will often be found in cultural contexts where it is 
honored only in the breach. 
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Three stories: 
One of my young law students in Ethiopia decided, perhaps in an excess of Western 
learning or adolescent hormones, to exercise his free speech rights by mimeographing 
a screed headlined “Tagel” (“Struggle”) calling for students to unite in calling for 
Emperor Haile Sellassie to step down from the Throne of Kings. “Sibu” was 
unsuccessful in his experiment in participatory democracy, and I had to go every 
Sunday to bring him food in the mud-pit concentration camp styled the local prison. It 
is clear that in the setting of Ethiopia, merely to have an open expression of opposition 
to the sitting government raises an implication of fundamental civil disorder that the 
government will instinctively interpret as posing a “clear and present danger” 
justifying repressive constraint. In fact it has been reported that one of the reasons the 
CUD Kinijet received many of its votes in Ethiopia’s May election, especially in 
outlying districts, was disquiet amongst voters who had never before heard 
dissenting voices in the Ethiopian press. Hearing opposition candidates speaking 
publicly in criticism of the EPRDF during the runup to the election, they assumed that 
the government party had lost control of governance, and so they transferred their 
affiliation to the bloc that apparently had the power to challenge the government with 
impunity. That instinctive reaction against a leadership that tolerates open dissent 
replicated an ancient highland cultural phenomenon — (historically, in conflicts 
between negus leaders, including the confrontation between Lij Yasu and the 
adolescent Ras Tefari before he became Haile Sellassie, armed blocs would shift their 
loyalties when it became clear from verbal counter-challenges, “shillelah,” that 
another leader was stronger than theirs). It also illustrates sensitively how much 
evolution must occur in a population starting out on the democratic road before it is 
able to consider a Western conception of civil rights. But as for me in the 1970s, it 
should be noted that I never seriously considered resigning my law teaching position 
in solidarity with my wronged young student Sibu. 
Then there was “Dapper Dan,” the newly-arrived young law professor from 
California who was deeply offended when he heard about Sibu’s incarceration and 
other similar restraints on free speech. Dapper Dan looked at me with disdain, saying 
that “by your silent acquiescence in the face of this violation of free speech rights, you 
are as guilty as the police.” Then he bolted off to lead a group of students on a march 
from Sidist Kilo to Arat Kilo. He did not make it to Arat Kilo. His students joined Sibu 
in prison, and Dan found himself back in southern California. Was I indeed approving 
an authoritarian regime by acquiescing? Should I have joined Dan (on his march, I 
mean, not his trip back to California)? One makes a constant series of judgments, 
deciding where and how one’s fundamental principles can be held and exercised with 
cultural relativity in a setting that in other contexts would impossibly contradict those 
principles. In gauging the sometimes indiscernible progress of the nation toward a 
modern somewhat democratic polity in Ethiopia, one often hears the familiar mantra, 
“Qes beQes inQulal be Igru yihedal”— roughly, “Slowly, slowly, little by little, even 
the egg will hatch out feet and learn to walk.” 
But there was indeed a time that I did feel obliged to take direct action in violation of 
Imperial law, although I felt no need to do so overtly. The student who lived in our 
house, “Zeberga,” had had a typically amazing life story. He had been raised in the 
South of Ethiopia, out in the fields at the age of five guarding his father’s goats with a 
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spear against the gyb hyenas. He had walked barefoot to Addis at the age of ten to 
join his brother as a streetboy shining shoes, sleeping at night under scavenged 
construction materials. By the age of twelve he had learned to read from poring over 
tattered schoolbooks with his brother who had worked his way into night school 
classes, and he won a scholarship into the sixth grade in a government school. At the 
age of seventeen he was a senior in high school and had been elected president of the 
All-Ethiopia Students Association. Protected while he was in my home during the 
year of student strikes and protests, it was clear that he was targeted for arrest and 
disappearance. Three of his friends were grabbed from the streets and killed. His 
family had been roughly questioned about him, and told there was a death warrant 
issued for him. Through several illegal manoeuvres I was able to get him out of the 
country on an early morning plane to Israel, and 15 months later he was enrolled in 
this great university. From barefoot spear-carrying shepherd boy facing gyb, to 
Harvard freshman facing the world, in the space of 9 years. Zeberga’s instinctive skills 
in cultural relativity had to be far more developed than mine. 
The issue of free speech civil rights illustrates a spectrum of such demands upon all 
who travel between two worlds. When you work in a nation that is early on its road to 
democracy, you are part of a building process, a work-in-progress. You cannot expect 
a nation newly emerging into a constitutional era to become an instantly coherent 
constitutional democracy. (As recent developments indicate, we in the USA still are in 
the process of defining our constitutional democracy.) 
 
In sum... 
 
Moving between legal systems we, inevitably, constantly, and dynamically, have to 
make situational judgments and choices. As a wise man once said, for persons of 
integrity the guiding principle must be “This above all, to thine own self be true.” In 
some cases we may find it necessary to make public or private oppositional choices, or 
choose to step away from our position, as a matter of principle. It would seem to be 
anathema to professional integrity, for instance, to acquiesce in a legal system that 
applies the international legal term “genocide”—carrying a threat of death by hanging 
for the 131 journalists, elected officials, educators, lawyers, and other citizens so 
accused—for acts merely deemed threatening or insulting to the government!  
In other settings, however, as you pursue a life path accompanying an imperfect 
nation on its bumpy progress toward modernity, you may choose to live according to 
the old country adage — based on the realism of farmers jogging behind their string 
of animals heavy-laden with grain on the way to market — “Ahiya yeneda, fess 
yesmama.”... “If you are going to run along behind the donkeys you must learn to 
tolerate the farts.” 
 
